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On July 20, 2014, the P5 + 1 and Iran announced that they had agreed 
to extend the deadline for concluding their negotiations regarding the 
Iranian nuclear program until November 24. In Israel and the 
surrounding Arab states, no one seemed to pay much notice. Had this 
event taken place a year or two earlier, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu certainly would have protested loudly that the delay 
represented weakness on the part of the 5 + 1 and an American failure 
to confront the Iranian nuclear threat more aggressively, and would 
have coupled these remarks with renewed threats against Iran. Israel’s 
immediate neighbors would have responded with quieter expressions 
of dismay, perhaps accompanied for appearance sake by criticism of 
Israel’s own nuclear profile. 
It seems, then, that the events that transpired in the region in recent 
months have had a major effect on the degree of concern Israel and its 
neighbors evince regarding Iran and on the priority they assign to the 
perceived Iranian threat. To be sure, due note is also taken of the 5 + 
1’s refusal to offer Iran dangerous concessions, i.e., the fact that this 
round of negotiations with Iran did not end in a “bad” deal. One way or 
another, understanding these events and their influence is key to any 
attempt to assess attitudes toward the Iran nuclear talks in the four 
months ahead. 
Three regional dynamics inform this assessment. One is the 
dramatic territorial gains registered by the militant Sunni Islamist 
group ISIS and their ramifications regarding Iraq, Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan 
and the US posture in the region. A second is the collapse of the US-
sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace process and subsequent events 
leading to Hamas’ attacks on Israel and the latter’s aggressive 
response. And a third, which interacts dramatically with the first two 
dynamics, is the region’s response to the broad impression of both US 
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withdrawal from many aspects of active involvement in conflict 
situations and concomitant American strategic policy mistakes. 
The emergence of the Islamic State: a new Levant reality 
In a dramatic campaign in June, the militant Islamist group ISIS (Daish) 
completed a six-month conquest of much of eastern Syria and western 
Iraq. The territory was quickly designated the Islamic State; its leaders 
proclaimed their objective of conquering additional Arab lands in Iraq, 
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and vanquishing Arab Shiites 
everywhere, thereby placing all surrounding countries on high alert. 
ISIS units and related groups quickly threatened Jordan’s borders with 
western Iraq and southern Syria, where they also potentially 
threatened Israel. This move at least temporarily consummated a 
strategic process begun in early 2011 when civil war broke out in Syria: 
the collapse of at least a portion of the post-Ottoman state system that 
had been created following the Sykes-Picot agreement nearly 100 years 
ago. The IS currently comprises a large land mass, millions of Sunni 
Arabs, and petro-carbon wealth that renders the “stat” virtually self-
supporting. 
One immediate outcome was the Kurdish occupation of Kirkuk with 
its historic significance and its oil treasure – a long-sought objective of 
the Kurdish national movement. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership set in 
motion a process that could soon lead to a Kurdish declaration of 
independence, thereby moving Iraq a step closer to genuine dis-
integration and partition into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish entities that 
could even overflow across the old national borders. The Kurds in what 
was once northern Iraq and northern Syria are consolidating their 
territorial and economic control, plagued only by their own lack of 
unity. The Assad regime in Damascus has seemingly become resigned 
to a best-case scenario of holding onto “Useful Syria” in the western 
sector and abandoning much of the rest of Syria to IS and other 
disparate Islamist and other movements. 
Here Iran enters the picture. Confronting the IS threat, Tehran is 
determined to support its regional allies, the Alawites in Damascus and 
the Shiites in Baghdad. Politically they represent its most successful 
investment in regional Shiite-related rule since the advent of the 
Islamic Republic some 35 years ago. And geographically they link 
Tehran, itself a state supporter of terrorism, all the way to Hizballah’s 
stronghold on the western tip of the “Shiite arc” on the Mediterranean 
shores of southern Lebanon, from where Iran seeks to threaten and 
deter Israel.  
Another major factor is the United States: the seeming collapse of 
Iraq’s army in northern Iraq, an army trained and armed by the US that 
dissolved once confronted by a few thousand salafis and their local 
Sunni tribal and other allies, represents a major American strategic 
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failure. This has placed the Obama administration in the uncomfortable 
position of contemplating cooperation with Iran to stabilize Iraq and 
conceivably, or ultimately, Syria as well. The fall of Mosul to ISIS, 
following upon the Ukraine/Crimea crisis of recent months, the 
chemical weapons drama in Syria last year, and the failure of US-
sponsored Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations, all combined to 
portray Washington in the eyes of Middle East actors as lacking in both 
military and diplomatic credibility, even if many Americans consider 
President Obama’s caution to be justified and his decision-making 
sound.  
As we shall see, both Israel and many Arab actors reacted 
aggressively to this perception of American weakness in the region 
even as the Iran nuclear talks appeared to be registering slow but 
certain progress. Correspondingly, the advent of IS amplified Russia’s 
concerns over salafi terrorism at home while (in stark contrast to the 
US) boosting Russian efforts to reestablish a serious presence in the 
Middle East. And Europe could now contemplate not only another wave 
of refugees from the region but also an upsurge in local Muslim 
volunteers for the new jihad, some of whom would eventually return as 
terrorists. 
The failed US-sponsored peace process and subsequent 
war in Gaza 
By May 2014 it was clear that the nine-month attempt by US Secretary 
of State Kerry to bring about a two-state solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict had failed. The reasons are multifold and are 
relevant to our discussion insofar as they appear to many in the Middle 
East to reflect poor American understanding of regional dynamics and, 
consequently, poor strategic decision-making. Of particular interest in 
the security context is Israel’s rejection as “unrealistic” of a concerted 
US effort to produce a viable security regime for the West Bank under 
which the Israeli military presence could be phased out.  
Kerry’s enterprise was not merely another failed attempt to 
implement the 1993 Oslo accords. By now it should have been clear 
that Israelis’ and Palestinians’ opposing narratives regarding the 
events of 1948 are irreconcilable; an effective process would have 
focused exclusively on post-1967 issues such as borders and security 
and set aside issues like holy places and refugee right of return. 
Washington should also have recognized that this dis-functionality 
built into the process was reflected in the very act of bringing together a 
sovereign state, Israel, and a national liberation movement, the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, whose primary constituency is in the 
Palestinian refugee diaspora, just as it was reflected in the attempt to 
bring together two leaders, the PLO’s Mahmoud Abbas and Israel’s 
Binyamin Netanyahu, whose ideological and political concerns and 
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regional preoccupations were antithetical to a process based on trust 
and compromise.  
Under these circumstances, heavy American and other international 
pressure would have been necessary to induce even a hope of progress. 
But it was not forthcoming. Finally, and given the challenges Kerry 
encountered, the objective of ending the conflict in nine months was 
wildly unrealistic.  
It would probably have been wiser for Kerry to avoid initiating two-
state negotiations entirely. Failed talks, particularly talks ballyhooed 
enthusiastically by a chronically optimistic US secretary of state, have a 
way of making matters worse. And that is precisely what happened, 
though precisely to what extent the damage to American prestige and 
influence in the region directly contributed to this new Israeli-
Palestinian deterioration can only be a matter of conjecture.  
Thus it transpired that a part of Kerry’s confidence-building 
package, prisoner-release by Israel, was aborted in the final stages of 
the talks. In parallel, Abbas responded to Kerry's failure by bringing 
Hamas into a Palestinian Authority unity government arrangement that 
gave the Islamist movement greater freedom of activity in the West 
Bank. This was followed by the abduction and murder of three Israeli 
yeshiva students, apparently by “freelancing” Hamas militants, in a 
settlement area near Bethlehem. This in turn generated a huge 
manhunt and the arrest of hundreds of Hamas activists, including 
prisoners released by Israel in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, 
and the revenge murder of a Palestinian teenager in East Jerusalem. 
Hamas responded by attacking Israel from the Gaza Strip, thereby 
initiating a war that was thoroughly preoccupying Netanyahu when on 
July 20 the Iran nuclear talks were adjourned with a new, four-month 
deadline. 
Even before the Gaza war began, and with greater emphasis once it 
was underway, Netanyahu responded to regional events by publicly 
revising his strategic threat assessment for Israel in a manner that both 
downgraded the Iran threat and positioned him in open confrontation 
with some aspects of the US regional posture. In many ways, his newly 
enunciated positions appeared to correspond with those of moderate 
Arab neighbors: Egypt – which collaborated closely with Israel during 
the Gaza fighting, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf emirates. 
In a policy speech at a Tel Aviv think tank on June 29 and again in a 
press conference on July 11, after the Gaza war began, Netanyahu 
allowed that Israel’s updated security challenges were now defending 
its borders against militant Islam (ISIS, Hamas, Hizballah), “shaping” 
the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River from a 
security standpoint, regional cooperation against extremism, and 
preventing Iran from reaching a nuclear threshold.  
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Not only was Iran now relegated to fourth on the list. During the 
very countdown to the P5 + 1 July 20 deadline, gone were the threats of 
a new Holocaust and the ominous innuendos regarding Israel 
maintaining its right to use military force against Iran’s nuclear 
program. Criticism of the negotiating positions taken by the P5 + 1 was 
articulate, but muted. The message was that Netanyahu would still 
lobby the P5 + 1 but would apparently acquiesce in whatever agree-
ment they reach. 
Further, the new reality in which the primary threat is Islamic State, 
Hamas and Hizballah dictates several lines of defense that totally 
contradict not only the US security proposals offered by Kerry and 
addressed fairly constructively by Netanyahu during the two-state 
solution talks. Indeed, they even constitute a reversal of Netanyahu’s 
own negotiating position. Thus the Israeli prime minister now requires 
a Jordan Valley border fence, an open-ended Israeli military presence 
in the Valley, and the right to intervene militarily anywhere in the 
future Palestinian state (“shaping”) without prior coordination.  
In effect, Netanyahu felt free to slam the door on any US attempt to 
renew the peace process with the Palestinians by diminishing the end 
product to a Palestinian Bantustan. In a second open affront to 
Washington, Netanyahu gratuitously welcomed the independence of 
Kurdistan in the territory between IS and Turkey. That the Kurdish 
leadership did not solicit Israel’s embrace was of lesser significance 
than the fact that the emergence of a separate Kurdish state directly 
contradicts Washington’s aspiration, shared by Iran, to hold Iraq 
together. Israel, and almost certainly Saudi Arabia and Jordan, appear 
to prefer a fragmented Iraq part of which is held by fanatic Sunni 
Islamists as a means of weakening Iran’s drive for hegemony in the 
Shiite arc, even at the risk of having to confront those same Sunni 
Islamists on their own borders. 
In parallel, reflecting Netanyahu's third new security priority, the 
Israeli government floated ideas for integrating Israeli-Palestinian 
peace and security arrangements into security and economic 
cooperation agreements with surrounding Arab states, including Saudi 
Arabia and the emirates. Here is an attempt to leverage shared 
concerns over Iran, ISIS, Hamas and Hizballah into expanded Israel-
Arab relations, and in so doing blunt pressures for direct Israeli 
concessions to the Palestinians. Not surprisingly, all of Israel’s Arab 
interlocutors, both overt (Egypt and Jordan) and informal (Saudi Arabia 
and the emirates), continued to rebuff these proposals, citing the need 
for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement as a sine qua non for a truly open 
security relationship. The fact that the war that erupted in and around 
Gaza in July played into tensions between Egypt and Saudi Arabia (the 
anti-Muslim Brotherhood camp) on the one hand and Qatar and Turkey 
– the lone Middle East state supporters of Hamas and the Brethren – on 
the other did not appear to soften this stance. 
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Full-fledged US security cooperation with Israel continued 
throughout this period and appeared not to have been affected by 
Jerusalem’s overt reservations regarding American policy wisdom and 
commitments in the Middle East. But US defense aid to Egypt was 
curtailed in protest over constraints on democratic expression there. 
And the American commitment to supporting militarily the efforts of 
moderate forces fighting the Assad regime in Syria, always limited, was 
reduced even further in response to ISIS’ triumphs, thereby prompting 
Jordan to weigh a more even-handed approach toward Assad. An effort 
by Secretary of State Kerry to mediate a ceasefire in the Gaza conflict by 
integrating some of Hamas’ conditions as represented by Qatar and 
Turkey ran into open and occasionally offensive expressions of lack of 
confidence by both Cairo and Jerusalem. 
The months ahead 
Assuming the broad drift of Israeli and Arab attitudes toward 
Washington’s Middle East policies and actions does not appreciably 
change during the coming four months, it would appear that P5 + 1 
success in reaching an agreement with Iran concerning its nuclear 
program and sanctions relief will not provoke any significant Israeli or 
Arab reaction. Moreover, the current sense of growing US detachment 
from the region will prevail. Israel and its more moderate Arab 
neighbors will be on the lookout for alternatives, including closer 
relations with Russia. Moscow, after all, appears anxious to augment its 
Middle East profile and appears to some in the region to have a better 
understanding than Washington of the radical wave of change 
sweeping the Arab world. 
These indications of even the mere potential for a tectonic shift in 
US and Russian interests, influence and capabilities in the Middle East 
should alarm western strategic observers. 
And if the P5 + 1 fail and there is no further extension of their 
nuclear negotiations with Iran? Israel, Saudi Arabia and most of the 
emirates will react with alarm. Israel in particular will have to factor 
this development into an already alarming threat perception with 
regard to the militant Islamists gathering on its borders. So will Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia, though unlike Israel they do not claim to possess the 
capability of dealing directly with Iran by military means. On the other 
hand, failure to “solve” the Iranian nuclear threat also affords 
Netanyahu yet another excuse to avoid softening his position regarding 
a Palestinian state and to continue absorbing that state’s potential 
territory, to the long-term detriment of Israel’s real interest in 
remaining a Jewish and democratic state. 
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